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LEGAL SHORTS
RECENT KEYNOTE DECISIONS AFFECTING THE
MONTANA PRACTITIONER
1. WAGES V. FIRST NAT'L INS. CO. OFAMERICA'
In Wages v. First Nat'l Ins. Co. of America, the Montana Su-
preme Court ruled that a parent of a minor child who does not
witness an accident, wherein the child is seriously injured, is en-
titled to maintain an independent, non-derivative claim for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).
Gerald Wages' son, Skylar, was roller-blading in front of his
parents' home when Phillip Pegar ran over him.2 Wages did not
witness the accident and was not home at the time; he was noti-
fied by telephone at work.3 As a result of the accident, Skylar
experienced bilateral pelvic fractures and complete urethral dis-
ruption, which required him to undergo at least four major inva-
sive and expensive surgeries as well as considerable physical
therapy.4 Because the surgeries were not entirely successful,
Wages must catheterize his son three to four times a day with a
large catheter tube.5 Also, Wages has had to take his son to the
children's hospital in Salt Lake City for medical treatment sev-
1. 2003 MT 309, 318 Mont. 232, 79 P.3d 1095.
2. Id. 3.
3. Id.
4. Id. 4.
5. Id.
1
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eral times, resulting in absences from work and lost income. 6
Pegar was insured with First National Insurance Company
(FNIC) on the day he struck Skylar; he had $25,000/$50,000 li-
ability coverage. 7 Through a court-appointed guardian and con-
servator, Skylar settled his claim for the $25,000 limit.8 Wages
then submitted a claim to FNIC for $25,000 for NIED.9 FNIC
denied the claim, maintaining that under Montana law, Wages
could not sustain an independent non-derivative claim for NIED
without witnessing the accident. 10 Wages then filed suit for de-
claratory relief against FNIC. Both FNIC and Wages filed mo-
tions for summary judgment. The district court granted FNIC's
motion for summary judgment, concluding that "duty in a NIED
case ... exists only to those who actually witness the accident"
and awarded FNIC its costs of defense with ten-percent inter-
est.'1 Wages appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
On appeal, Wages argued that in Sacco v. High Country In-
dependent Press, Inc.,12 the Supreme Court overruled the prior
requirement of Versland v. Caron Transport,13 that only a by-
stander can recover for NIED. Under Sacco, an independent
cause of action for NIED arises under circumstances where 1)
serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was 2) the
reasonably foreseeable consequence of 3) the defendant's negli-
gent act or omission.14 As the court in Sacco explained "serious
or severe emotional distress" is defined by employing the defini-
tion of these terms found in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
which provides in pertinent part:
[Emotional distress] includes all highly unpleasant mental reac-
tions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embar-
rassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea. It is
only where it is extreme that the liability arises. Complete emo-
tional tranquility is seldom attainable in this world, and some de-
gree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the
price of living among people. The law intervenes only where the
distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable [person] could be
expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the dis-
6. Id.
7. Wages, 6.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. %8
12. 271 Mont. 209, 896 P.2d 411 (1995).
13. 206 Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583 (1983).
14. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426.
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tress are factors to be considered in determining its severity. Se-
vere distress must be proved .... 15
Wages asserted that all three elements were satisfied as he
had suffered serious or severe emotional distress that was a rea-
sonably foreseeable consequence of Pegar's act. 16 Wages high-
lighted that the second element, foreseeability, was satisfied as
it is "indisputably foreseeable" that a parent could suffer NIED
from having his or her child severely injured as a result of some-
one's negligent driving.17
FNIC responded that in Treichel v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co.,18 decided two years after Sacco, the Su-
preme Court reintroduced the bystander requirement of Ver-
sland which requires that one have "sensory and contemporane-
ous perception of the accident" in order to recover on a claim of
NIED.' 9 In Treichel, a woman was bicycling with her husband
when she witnessed a car fatally hit him.20 She brought an in-
dependent non-derivative claim for NIED. 2' The court ruled
that the wife could maintain her claim because, among other
things, she had witnessed the accident. 22 FNIC urged the court
to craft a "Treichel rule" that only those who witness the acci-
dent and have "personal, on the scene, direct physical and emo-
tional impact" can bring a claim of NIED.23 According to FNIC,
the existence of duty depends on the foreseeablilty of harm and
that foreseeablility requires on-the-scene witnessing of the acci-
dent. 24 Therefore, because Wages had not witnessed the acci-
dent, FNIC maintained that Pegar had no established legal duty
to Wages and therefore breached no legal duty to him.25
First, the court noted that although Versland did require a
person have "sensory and contemporaneous perception of the ac-
cident" in order to recover on a claim for NIED, Sacco expressly
overruled Versland and its bystander requirement.26 The court
15. Sacco, 271 Mont. at 234, 896 P.2d at 426 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§ 46, comment j at 77-78).
16. Wages, 13-14.
17. Id. 15.
18. 280 Mont. 443, 930 P.2d 661 (1997).
19. Wages, 17.
20. 280 Mont. 444-45, 930 P.2d 662.
21. 280 Mont. 445, 930 P.2d 663.
22. 280 Mont. 449, 930 P.2d 665.
23. Wages, 17.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. 21.
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rejected FNIC's argument that it reintroduced the bystander re-
quirement in Treichel.27 The court explained that in Treichel,
the issue was whether the "Each Person" or "Each Accident" lim-
its of liability set forth in the State Farm insurance policy held
by the wife and her deceased husband in Treichel applied to her
claim for NIED.28 The court maintained that its fundamental
ruling of Sacco was undisturbed. 29
The court explained that in Sacco, it severed the previously
mandatory nexus between witnessing the accident and foresee-
ability, and established that a defendant can owe a duty to a
NIED claimant even in circumstances where the claimant was
not at the scene of the accident. 30 Therefore, the Supreme Court
ruled that the district court had erred in premising its conclu-
sions solely on the fact that Wages did not witness the accident.
Consequently it reversed and remanded the matter to the dis-
trict court to "determine once again, under Sacco and not Trei-
chel, whether Wages was a foreseeable plaintiff."31 For such a
determination, the court advised district courts to consider the
following factors: 1) the closeness of the relationship between
the plaintiff and victim; 2) the age of the victim; 3) the severity
of the injury of the victim; and 4) any other factors bearing on
the question.32 Also, the court advised that while a district court
may consider whether the plaintiff was a bystander to the acci-
dent, it may not rely exclusively on the fact that a plaintiff was
not a bystander to conclude that such a plaintiff is unforesee-
able.33
In Wages, the court made it clear that the bystander re-
quirement is no more and that claims of NIED must be analyzed
under Sacco. The abolition of the bystander requirement, of
course, greatly expands the "who" in who is a foreseeable plain-
tiff and therefore entitled to bring a claim of NIED. The court,
however, attempted to narrow its ruling by emphasizing that
the resulting emotional distress must be serious or severe under
the Restatement definition. Although many a parent or spouse
of an accident victim may bring a NIED claim under Wages, re-
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Wages, 25.
31. Id. (Emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Wages, 25.
Vol. 65414
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lief will only be granted to those whose have suffered serious or
severe emotional distress as a result.
James D. Johnson
2. JACOBSEN V. FARMERS UNION MUTUAL INS. 34
In Jacobsen v. Farmers Union Mutual Ins., the Montana
Supreme Court ruled, in a matter of first impression, that an
emotional injury suffered by a driver who witnessed an accident
was not a "bodily injury" within the meaning of the driver's un-
insured motorist coverage.
In July 2000, Robert Jacobsen was driving his vehicle near
Vaughn, Montana, when he saw an oncoming vehicle cross the
center median and come to a stop in a wheat field.3 5 Jacobsen
pulled over to assist the driver, Kenneth Keyser.36 Jacobsen
found Keyser unconscious with blood flowing from his head.37
Jacobsen attempted to stop the bleeding by applying pressure to
the wound.38 The paramedics arrived several minutes later and
transported Keyser to the hospital. 39 When the paramedics ex-
tricated Keyser from the vehicle, Jacobsen saw a handgun.40
Keyser died a few days later in the hospital.41 His cause of
death was determined to be suicide from a self-inflicted gunshot
wound. 42
Jacobsen sought counseling in September of 2001 for the
emotional distress that he had suffered as a result of the inci-
dent with Keyser. 43 Keyser was not insured at the time of his
death."
In February of 2002, Jacobsen filed a complaint for both
emotional distress damages and medical pay benefits against his
34. 2004 MT 72, 320 Mont. 375, 87 P.3d 995.
35. Id. $] 4.
36. Id.
37. Id. 91 5.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Jacobson, 5.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. $1 6.
44. Id.
5
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insurer, Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (Farmers
Union), under his uninsured motorist (UM) coverage. 45
Jacobsen claimed that his emotional distress constituted "bodily
injury" under his policy, thereby qualifying him for UM cover-
age. 46 Farmers Union insisted that Jacobsen's emotional inju-
ries were not compensable under the language of his UM pol-
icy.47
Both Jacobsen and Farmers Union filed for summary judg-
ment, which was granted to Farmers Union by the district
court.48 The district court concluded that Jacobson's emotional
distress and its physical manifestations did not constitute bodily
injury, and that even if it did, his emotional distress was not
caused by Keyser's use of an uninsured vehicle, but from his use
of a handgun. 49 Jacobson appealed the district court's order
granting summary judgment to Farmer Union to the Montana
Supreme Court.
On appeal, Jacobsen argued that the district court had
erred in finding that he did not suffer "bodily injury" as defined
under the Farmers Union UM policy. The relevant portions of
that policy provide:
We will pay all sums the "insured" is legally entitled to recover as
compensatory damages from the owner or driver of an "uninsured
motor vehicle." The damages must result from "bodily injury" sus-
tained by the "insured" caused by the "accident." The owner's or
driver's liability for these damages must result from the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of the "uninsured motor vehicle."50
Consistent with the statutory language in Section 33-23-
201, MCA, the policy defied "bodily injury" as: "bodily injury,
sickness or disease sustained by a person including death result-
ing from any of these."51
Jacobsen argued that the court has long recognized that
mental or emotional injuries may be compensable absent physi-
cal injury or physical contact, citing to Treichel v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.52 In Treichel, a woman was bicy-
cling with her husband when she witnessed a car fatally hit
45. Id. 17.
46. Jacobson, 7.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. 12.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 280 Mont. 443, 930 P.2d 661 (1997).
416 Vol. 65
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him.53 She brought an independent non-derivative claim for
NIED. 54 The court ruled that the wife could maintain the claim
even though she herself has not sustained physical injury or
physical contact. 55 Jacobson urged the court to recognize that
his claims for emotional distress were, like the wife's in Treichel,
compensable under his UM policy.56
Jacobsen also directed the court's attention to Workers'
Compensation case law and the Act itself, which clearly excludes
emotional distress as "bodily injury."57 Jacobsen asserted that,
unlike the Workers' Compensation Act, his UM policy does not
unambiguously exclude emotional distress in its definition of
bodily injury, and therefore, the ambiguity should be interpreted
in his favor.58
In response, Farmers Union recognized that the Montana
Supreme Court had never directly addressed the issue of
whether emotional injuries constitute "bodily injury" as defined
in a particular policy and directed the court to Aetna Cas. And
Sur. Co v. First Sec. Bank of Bozeman.59 In Aetna, the Federal
District Court for Montana considered a UM policy containing
an identical definition of "bodily injury."60 Applying relevant
Montana law, the Aetna court determined that given the Mon-
tana Supreme Court's previous recognition that there is a differ-
ence between physical injury and mental distress, that the Mon-
tana Supreme Court would hold that the term bodily injury as
used in the liability insurance policy at issue limits coverage to
physical injury, sickness, or disease. 61
First, the Montana Supreme Court distinguished Jacobsen's
authorities. As the court explained, in Treichel, the issue was
whether the wife's emotional injury was a separate injury inde-
pendent of that of her husband's. 62 Unlike Jacobsen's policy
with Farmers Union, the policy at issue in Treichel did not de-
fine bodily injury and therefore the wife was able to recover for
53. 280 Mont. 444-45, 930 P.2d 662.
54. 280 Mont. 445, 930 P.2d 663.
55. 280 Mont. 449, 930 P.2d 665.
56. Jacobson, 13.
57. Id. 21.
58. Id.
59. 662 F.Supp. 1126 (D. Mont. 1987)
60. 662 F. Supp. at 1127.
61. 662 F. Supp. at 1128-29.
62. 280 Mont. at 449. 930 P.2d at 635.
2004 417
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her separate emotional injury.63 Next, the court dismissed the
Workers' Compensation case law cited by Jacobsen as not being
relevant because they were not purely contractual in nature.64
Recognizing that federal decisions are not binding on it, the
court agreed with the rationale of the Montana Federal District
Court in Aetna and similarly concluded that "the term 'bodily in-
jury,' as defined in the Farmers Union UM policy, is limited to
physical injury to a person caused by an accident and does not
include emotional and psychological injuries stemming there-
from."6
5
Because the court concluded that Jacobsen's emotional in-
juries did not satisfy the definition of "bodily injury" under the
UM policy, and therefore coverage did not exist, the court did
not have to address the issue of whether his injuries resulted
from Keyser's ownership, maintenance, or use of his uninsured
motor vehicle. 66
In its ruling that emotional injury absent physical contact
does not constitute "bodily injury" within the meaning of an un-
insured motorist policy, the court correctly refused to mix con-
tract principles with those of torts in cases involving serious
emotional distress.
James D. Johnson
3. UMLAND V. NATIONAL CASUALTY Co. 67
In Umland v. National Casualty Co., the Montana Supreme
Court applied Montana Code Annotated Section 1-1-21568 to de-
63. Jacobson, 16.
64. Id. 22.
65. Id. 91 29.
66. Id. 91 30.
67. 2003 MT 356, 319 Mont. 16, 81 P.3d 500.
68. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-215 provides:
(1) [A person's place of residence] is the place where a person remains when
not called elsewhere for labor or other special or temporary purpose and to
which the person returns for repose.
(2) There may only be one residence. If a person claims a residence within
Montana for any purpose, then that location is the person's residence for all
purposes unless there is a specific statutory exception.
(3) A residence cannot be lost until another is gained.
(4) The residence of a minor's parents or, if one of them is deceased or they do
not share the same residence, the residence of the parent having legal custody
or, if neither parent has legal custody, the residence of the parent with whom
418 Vol. 65
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termine dependant minor residency. Justice Nelson, writing for
the court, affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment to National Casualty on de novo review. 69 The court held
residency of minor children is to be determined by case by case
application of facts to the guideline residency factors listed in
the statute.70
The court, reviewing the district court's legal conclusions for
correctness, held Montana Code Annotated Section 1-1-215 pro-
vided the applicable guidelines for minor residency determina-
tion. 71 Therefore, the court declined to review the district court's
analysis of four additional factors under Farmers Union72 or
analyze the insurance agreements themselves. The court's deci-
sion affirmed the district court's authority to determine the resi-
dence of an unmarried minor and clarified that Montana does
not allow dual residency. 73
The plaintiff in this case, Wallace Umland, is the father of
Virgil Umland, a deceased minor passenger killed in a car acci-
dent on February 19, 1999. 74 At the time of Virgil's death Na-
tional Casualty Company issued business auto insurance to
Wallace providing underinsured motorist coverage for relatives
residing with the named insured. 75 After Virgil's death, Wal-
lace's girlfriend added Wallace to her AMCO insurance policy
providing underinsured motorist coverage for residents of the
named insured's household. 76 The conclusion of the district
court that Virgil was not a resident of Wallace's household at the
time of his death likely precludes coverage under these policies.
The court considered the following facts in light of the statu-
tory guidelines in making its decision that Virgil was not a resi-
dent of Wallace's household. Wallace and Virgil's mother lived
the minor customarily resides is the residence of the unmarried minor. In case
of a controversy, the district court may declare which parental residence is the
residence of an unmarried minor.
(5) The residence of an unmarried minor who has a parent living cannot be
changed by either the minor's own act or that of a minor's guardian.
(6) The residence can be changed only by the union of act and intent.
69. Id. 30
70. Id. 25 (applying Lima School Dist. No.12 v. Simonsen, 210 Mont. 100, 110-11,
683 P.2d 471, 476 (1984)).
71. Id. 8, 29
72. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blair, 250 Mont. 52, 817 P.2d 1156 (1991)
73. Umland 27
74. Id. 11
75. Id. 116
76. Id. 14
2004 419
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in Nevada for ten years prior to divorcing in August 1994. 77 The
divorce decree awarded physical custody to Virgil's mother and
visitation rights to Wallace. 78 Wallace moved to Montana in
1996 and began defaulting on his financial child support obliga-
tions shortly thereafter. Since the 1994 divorce, Virgil had lived
with his mother in Nevada as a resident of her household. 79
Plaintiff exercised his visitation rights for only three to four
months over the four years he resided in Montana.8 0 Plaintiff
did not support Virgil.81 Virgil's contacts, schooling, and athletic
involvement all occurred in Nevada through the financial and
emotional support of his mother.8 2
Additionally, the court refused to consider testimony offered
by Wallace that Virgil intended to visit him in Montana for a
substantial period had he survived because the intent was not
probative as to whether Virgil resided in Wallace's household "at
the time of his death."8 3
This decision clarifies the statutory analysis in Montana for
determination of dependent minor residency under circum-
stances of dual households, likely precluding coverage under in-
surance policy coverage for the determined non-resident parent.
J. Bowman Neely
4. STATE V. HERD8 4
In State v. Herd, the Montana Supreme Court addressed the
appropriate standard of review for criminal sentences that are
statutorily unreviewable by the Sentence Review Division.
Defendant Michelle Lee Herd was charged with four counts
of negligent homicide following a December 28, 2000, head-on
automobile collision near Bonner, Montana.8 5 On December 27,
2000 at about 9:30 p.m., Herd, then living near Seattle, Wash-
77. Id. 5
78. Id. 6. Visitation rights granted Plaintiff specify: "at all reasonable times and
places, including alternate weekends, holidays, and 6 continuous weeks during school
summer vacation." Id. 7
79. Id. 26
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. 36
84. 2004 MT 85, 320 Mont. 490, 87 P.3d 1017.
85. Id. 1 4-7.
420 Vol. 65
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ington, learned that her mother, a Great Falls, Montana resi-
dent, had suffered a stroke and would not likely live more than
forty-eight hours.8 6 With her sister, Herd set off on the all-night
drive to Great Falls on Interstate 90, sleeping for approximately
two and one-half hours along the way.8 7 At about 9:00 a.m. on
December 28, she exited 1-90 onto Highway 200 at Bonner, Mon-
tana, proceeding eastbound.88 Shortly thereafter, Herd moved to
the westbound lane to pass another eastbound vehicle; however,
rather than returning to her lane following the pass, she contin-
ued eastbound in the westbound lane.8 9 She subsequently col-
lided head-on with a westbound Volkswagen Beetle, killing all
four of its occupants. 90 Following the collision, Herd stated that,
having just exited a four-lane highway, she became confused
and failed to appreciate her location in the oncoming lane of
travel.91
Herd was charged with four counts of negligent homicide
pursuant to Section 45-5-104 of the Montana Code Annotated. 92
She ultimately pled guilty after reaching a Plea Agreement with
the Missoula County Attorney's Office, through which the State
agreed to recommend a twenty-year suspended sentence and a
five-year driving ban.93 At the sentencing hearing, however, the
district court sentenced Herd to concurrent twenty-year sen-
tences on Counts I and II and concurrent twenty-year sentences
on Counts III and IV, all suspended, with the two sets of concur-
rent sentences to run consecutively. 94 Among the conditions im-
posed, the district court banned Herd from driving for the entire
forty-year term of the sentences. 95 Herd appealed only the driv-
ing restriction imposed by the district court. 96
At the outset, the court addressed the issue of whether, un-
der its holding in State v. Montoya97, the Montana Supreme
Court was authorized to review the reasonableness of sentences
86. Id. 3.
87. Id. 4.
88. Id. IT 4-5.
89. Id. 5.
90. Herd, 5.
91. Id. 16.
92. Id. 7.
93. Id. 7-8.
94. Id. 9.
95. Id.
96. Herd, 9.
97. 1999 MT 180, 295 Mont. 288, 983 P.2d 937.
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like Herd's.98 Prior to the creation of the Sentence Review Divi-
sion (SRD) and the Montana Supreme Court's holding in
Montoya, the court used a two-tiered standard of review, review-
ing sentences for both legality and abuse of discretion.99 In
Montoya, the court held that, since the creation of the SRD, the
reasonableness of a sentence was a question for the SRD, and
that the Montana Supreme Court was confined to reviewing sen-
tences for legality only. 100 However, in State ex rel Holt v. Dis-
trict Court'01 , the court noted that the SRD possessed statutory
jurisdiction only to review sentences that involved a year or
more of actual incarceration. 10 2 The court in Herd reasoned that
"[niothing in Montoya suggests that it was our intent.., to
leave those with unreasonable sentencing conditions but no
term of incarceration without remedy."10 3 Accordingly, in cases
like Herd's, which evade SRD review, the court will use the pre-
SRD two-tiered approach. 0 4
The court then applied the two-tiered approach to Herd's
sentencing condition. First, the court found the sentence im-
posed to be legal; the district court was statutorily vested with
the authority to impose a sentence subjecting Herd to court over-
sight for forty years, and Herd lodged no objection to a forty-year
probationary term. 10 5 Turning to the second tier of its analysis,
however, the court concluded a forty-year driving ban, "under
the facts of the case and in light of the district court's findings",
amounted to an abuse of discretion. 10 6 The court reasoned the
forty-year ban "simply irreconcilable" with the tragic circum-
stances underlying the accident and with Herd's prospects for
rehabilitation and for leading a law-abiding life. 0 7 Further-
more, the absolute prohibition against driving compromised
Herd's ability to earn a living, serve family needs and satisfy her
restitution obligations, all of which, the court concluded, im-
paired the rehabilitation process. 08 Lastly, the court identified
98. Herd, 1 11.
99. Id.
100. Montoya, 15.
101. 2000 MT 142, 300 Mont. 35, 3 P.3d 608.
102. Id. 8, Herd, 21.
103. Herd, 22.
104. Id.
105. Id. 24.
106. Id. 25.
107. Id.
108. Id.
Vol. 65
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nothing of record suggesting the necessity of the driving ban to
protect the victims or society. 10 9 The district court therefore
abused its discretion in leveling such a long driving ban. 110
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray "strenuously" dissented from
the majority opinion, arguing the sentence at issue satisfied
both the legality and abuse of discretion standards."' As a pre-
liminary matter, Justice Gray noted one could "readily sympa-
thize" with any individual receiving tragic information concern-
ing a fellow family member's health. 12 Tragedy aside, however,
Justice Gray focused heavily upon the end result of Herd's er-
rant judgment - the deaths of four other individuals - and
Herd's guilty plea to four counts of negligent homicide - for
which Herd could have been sentenced to a maximum of eighty
years in prison. 1 3 Considering the eighty years to which Herd
could have been sentenced, Justice Gray reasoned the driving
ban "a gift.., inherently reasonable and entirely legal." 114 She
concluded, "[t]he tradeoff of not driving for 40 years as opposed
to incarceration for 80 years, for a person whose driving has
killed four people, seems an easy and very reasonable one to
me.""l 5
To be sure, the court's decision in Herd provides a necessary
safeguard against unfair sentences falling outside the purview of
the SRD. Not even Justice Gray's dissent objected to, much less
addressed, resurrection of the two-tier legality and abuse of dis-
cretion analysis. Yet, while Herd provides the framework by
which sentence conditions falling outside the purview of the
SRD must be measured, it undermines the discretion of judges
and prosecutors by injecting uncertainty into the sentencing
process as to the types and ranges of sentences that will be tol-
erated under the abuse of discretion standard. Perhaps addi-
tional decisions reviewing sentences under the abuse of discre-
tion standard will do more to clarify the true bounds of a judge's
discretion.
Malin J. Stearns
109. Herd, % 25.
110. Id.
111. Id. 9 29.
112. Id. 30.
113. Id. [ 30-32.
114. Id. T1 36.
115. Herd, 91 36.
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5. Crawford v. Washington116
On March 8, 2004, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decided
Crawford v. Washington, and in doing so, handed down a deci-
sion that has been termed the most "defense-friendly" opinion in
recent memory.117 In deciding Crawford, the Court overruled
Ohio v. Roberts118 and held that the Sixth Amendment Confron-
tation Clause does not allow the admission of out-of-court testi-
mony when the witness is absent from trial and the defendant
has had no opportunity for cross-examination. 119 Roberts had
previously established the admissibility of an unavailable wit-
ness's statements against a criminal defendant if it could by
shown that the statements bore adequate "indicia of reliability"
by falling within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or exhibited
other "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. "120
Although the impact of Crawford will be felt whenever a
criminal prosecutor attempts to rely on a statement made by an
unavailable witness, it is likely that the greatest effect of the de-
cision will be in two principle areas of criminal law: (1) Prosecu-
tion of domestic violence cases where the victim is reluctant (or
refuses) to testify; and (2) Prosecution of child abuse cases where
testimony of the victim was previously admitted under the Rob-
erts criteria or statutory exceptions to hearsay prohibitions. 121
In Crawford, the defendant was prosecuted for stabbing a
man who had allegedly tried to rape his wife. 22 The defendant
and his wife had gone together to the victim's apartment where
a fight ensued and the victim was stabbed. 123 After the stabbing
the police apprehended the defendant and his wife, both pro-
vided tape-recorded statements to the police. 24 The defendant
asserted that he had acted in self-defense. 25 The defendant's
116. 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004).
117. Robin Franzen, Ruling on Hearsay Evidence Guts Cases, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 3,
2004, available at 2004 WL 58859205.
118. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
119. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1374.
120. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
121. For example, Montana has created express hearsay exceptions for the out-of-court
statements of a child who is an alleged victim of, or witness to, a sexual offense or other
crime of violence, including partner or family member assault, and is unavailable as a
witness. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-220(1)(a)-(c) (2003).
122. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1356.
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wife did not testify at his trial because of the Washington laws
on marital privilege, which generally barred a spouse from testi-
fying without the other spouse's consent. 126 However, in the
State of Washington, spousal privilege does not extend to out-of-
court statements that would be admissible under a hearsay ex-
ception, so prosecutors sought to introduce the wife's tape-
recorded statement to rebut the defendant's self-defense
claims. 127 Applying the Roberts tests, the trial court admitted
the wife's out-of-court statements and the defendant was con-
victed. 128 The conviction was reversed on appeal, with the
Washington Court of Appeals concluding that the wife's out-of-
court statements were not trustworthy. 129 The State's appeal to
the Washington Supreme Court resulted in reinstatement of the
conviction, which the defendant then appealed to the U.S. Su-
preme Court. 130
Justice Scalia wrote for the Court and couched the opinion in
an historical analysis of the origins of the Confrontation Clause
in the minds of the Framers, which, according to the Court, did
not necessarily include the admission of out-of-court statements
dependent "upon 'the law of Evidence for the time being."" 3'
More precisely, the Court stated, "Leaving the regulation of out-
of-court statements to the law of evidence would render the Con-
frontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most flagrant
inquisitorial practices."1 32
In adopting a historical perspective, the Court emphasized
the "testimonial" nature of statements made to modern a police
officers during the course of an investigation and likened such
statements to those made justices of the peace in pre-Colonial
England. 133 The Court then offered categories of modern "testi-
monial" statement to include:
[Eix parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent... affi-
davits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant
was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially...
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1358, citing Washington v. Burden, 841 P.2d 758 (Wash. 1992).
128. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1359.
131. Id. at 1364, citing 3 Wigmore § 1397, at 101; accord Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,
94(1970).
132. Crawford, 124 Sup. Ct. at 1364.
133. Id.
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extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial
materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony or con-
fessions ... [and] statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that
the statement would be available for use at a later trial."134
Although the Court specifically held that admission of out-of-
court "testimonial" statements in a criminal trial was a violation
of the Sixth Amendment, the Court refused to provide further
guidance on what an exact definition of "testimonial" would be.
On this point, the Court stated: "We leave for another day any
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.'
Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and to police interrogations. "135
The Court's refusal to be more specific was met with disap-
proval by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who, along with Justice
O'Conner, concurred in the judgment but dissented as to over-
ruling Roberts .136 As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
[T]he thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands
of state prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific
kinds of 'testimony' the Court lists . . . [t]hey need them now, not
months or years from now. Rules of criminal evidence are applied
every day in courts throughout the country, and parties should not
be left in the dark in this manner."1 37
Chief Justice Rehnquist's admonition appears to be ringing
true as lower courts have already begun wrestling with the issue
of what will be deemed "testimonial" in light of Crawford. For
example, one lower court recently ruled that an emergency 911
call to a police dispatcher during a domestic violence assault
should not be deemed a "testimonial" communication to the po-
lice so as to prohibit admission of the victim's out-of-court
statements at a defendant's trial. 38 It seems likely that similar
interpretive decisions in the lower courts will continue in light of
the Court's reluctance to provide a comprehensive definition of
what constitutes inadmissible "testimonial" out-of-court state-
ments.
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